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Samantha Geib
Theory and Writing of History

The Boston Molasses Disaster
There are moments in history that are consistently recalled and commemorated as a result
of their importance, but what happens when some of the most remarkable are forgotten
altogether, and how can we effectively reconstruct these events in a manner that does justice to
their significance? I was astounded when I stumbled upon the newspaper articles about the
Boston Molasses Disaster and could hardly believe that I had never heard of it before. It came as
news to me that on January 15, 1919, a molasses storage tank in the North End of Boston burst
open and sent a wave of this sticky substance into town, destroying buildings and homes and
killing those in its path. At first glance at the title of the disaster, I found it rather comical, but
after extensive researching, I would find that it was much more than a funny name; it was a
terrifying and fatal experience not only for the 21 people that it killed but also for the 150 that it
left mentally and physically broken. In this paper I will chart the event, paying close attention to
why the disaster occurred and taking notice of the civil lawsuit that subsequently followed. I
would also like to take note of the “news frenzy” that erupted at the time of the bizarre
occurrence, analyzing the difference in facts provided by periodicals at the time and the resulting
error and loss of truth that arose in the haste to deliver news to the public. I will argue that while
the disaster resulted in a high cost of damage and life, it also proved beneficial in that it paved
the way for future safety regulations concerning engineering protocol in industry.
I would like to begin with some background information about the tank itself, which
Steven Puleo provides wonderfully in his book Dark Tide: The Great Molasses Flood of 1919
and article “Death by Molasses.” From its initial stages of construction, one knew that the

holding tank was destined for trouble. In order to fully comprehend the reasoning behind the
poorly constructed tank, it is important to understand the circumstances under which it was built.
The person who United States Industrial Alcohol put in charge of the oversight of the
construction of the tank was their very own treasurer Arthur P. Jell. At the time, Jell was
suffering personal embarrassment at the expense of the project due to the fact that his bosses had
instructed him to have the tank built more than a year ago and yet it still remained incomplete. 1
With only the cement foundation finished, Jell had to hurry to get the tank completed and ready
to receive 700,000 gallons of molasses from a steamer coming from Cuba in just three short
days. 2 If he should fail, the company would have to either “find another USIA location to accept
the delivery or even dump the product at sea,” costing them both time and money, which Jell
simply could not have tainting his reputation. 3 Correspondingly, a failure on the project would
jeopardize the promotion he had been longing for and would essentially “doom his future with
the company.” 4 With that said, the construction job was done with certain haste. Jell did not
concern himself with the technicalities that accompany the engineering of a massive storage
tank, and when the tank did not leak after a so-called “stress test” (we would learn later through
court testimony that the test consisted of merely filling the tank with six inches of water), USIA
deemed it ready for use. 5 Jell got what he wanted; the five-story tank, 242 feet in circumference,
90 feet wide, with the ability to hold 2.3 million gallons of molasses was completed and
conveniently located just hundreds of feet from both the harbor and the railway on Boston’s
North End Commercial Street, which was a bustling business district right in the middle of a
densely populated Italian community. 6

Unfortunately, from the onset of its establishment, the tank appeared to have very
obvious structural problems. Witnesses would later testify in court to the poor condition of the
tank. For instance, Philip Lydon stated under oath,
We could feel it, the vibration, bulging in and out…There was always a
big leak, too, near the junction of the second and third plates…molasses
ran down the side of the tank, enough for the children in the neighborhood
to be there every day to get a dose of it. They would be here from early
morning till late at night. 7
Others including Frances Brown, Isaac Gonzalez, and Charles Chaffrey would reiterate this
statement, noting the overall lack of concern of USIA and the shoddy job performed by the
Hammond Iron Works construction crew. William Foster revealed one of the company’s quickfix remedies in the following testimony:
The tank kept leaking right up to the time of the collapse, but you could
not notice it so much at the last, because they repainted the tank…it was
kind of a dark reddish brown and you couldn’t see the molasses as
clearly. 8
USIA also ignored the anxieties of a particularly concerned employee, Isaac Gonzalez, who
repeatedly complained about the leaks and the scale-flakes raining down from the tank’s inside
walls. 9 Gonzalez was simply brushed aside, his “paranoia” met by the company’s halfhearted
attempts to remedy the tank, which consisted of a paint job and three instances where they
brought in caulkers. 10 As Lynda Morgenroth notes, USIA was far more concerned with the
profits they were making by creating much-needed munitions for World War I than they were
with repairing a leaky tank in Boston. 11
I would like to take a moment here to acknowledge the main author on this subject,
Steven Puleo, who seems to have written the only full account of the disaster. In almost every
other secondary source I used for this research paper, Puleo is cited in the bibliography or

acknowledgements; I, myself, must rely on him to fill in the blanks for the primary sources that I
could not get my hands on. While I am grateful to him for having created his wonderfully
informative book, Dark Tide, it makes me nervous that he seems to be the only person who is
fully educated on the catastrophe; with no one else extensively educated on the subject, who is
checking over Mr. Puleo’s work? How can we trust that his interpretation of the facts is true and
correct? After all, he says himself in his “Bibliographic Essay,”
I used the primary sources…to form the heart of the book’s narrative, weaving in
my knowledge of the event or the time period gleaned from other sources…In
some cases, I have built the dramatic narrative and drawn conclusions based on a
combination of primary and secondary sources. 12
This is where we as readers have to have faith in our historians and their abilities. I can only
hope that the desire to convey the absolute truth overcame the desire to distort the facts to
enhance his “dramatic narrative.” I have faith in his expertise, as he seems extensively educated
on the subject, but I am still skeptical about relying on him as a main source for my paper, as no
one else has endeavored to research the subject and thus no one else would feel comfortable
enough to put his work under scrutiny. Given also that he consulted over 25,000 pages of
transcript from the hearings—a very daunting task—I doubt that many would repeat or even
begin to criticize this great undertaking. With that said, there is essentially no way of knowing if
all the facts in his book are accurate and true, but for the purposes of writing about this
somewhat obscure topic, I am going to assume that they are mostly valid.
On January 15, 1919 just before 12:40 p.m., the molasses tank burst open, swallowing
everything in its path. The wave, traveling at approximately 35 miles per hour, stretched 15 feet
high and 160 feet wide and engulfed everything in the surrounding two blocks with 2.3 million
gallons of molasses. 13 An eyewitness would testify later in court,

I was looking from the window and I just—I come right on to the tank and I
noticed it ripped right up gave way at the bottom; it ripped right up from the
bottom and the molasses came right up, pushed the molasses towards me as I
came around the curve. 14
Other eyewitnesses would describe the first wave from the tank as being “high enough to shut
out the light, or 15 to 20 feet high, or high as a man, or like a big black ball.” 15 In his recent
article, “A Sticky Tragedy,” Chuck Lyons notes of the violent effects of the barreling steel parts.
“Rivets popping from the tank scourged the neighbourhood like machine gun bullets,” Lyons
writes “and a small boat was found slammed through a wooden fence like an artillery shell.” 16
The New York Times described the incident in these words: “Wagons, carts, and motor trucks
were overturned. A number of horses were killed. The street was strewn with debris intermixed
with molasses and all traffic was stopped.” 17 The Boston Post referred to the molasses as a
“black, reeking mass” that ensnared 100 men, women, and children, and crushed buildings,
teams, automobiles, and street cars. 18 Similarly, the Boston Evening Globe indicated that the
buildings most severely damaged by the disaster were the elevated L structure, the Clougherty
house, the freight house of the Bay State Street Railways, the quarters of the Fireboat Engine
company, the headhouse of North End Park, and the buildings of the Public Works department
(most notably the firehouse and freight shed). 19 Martin Clougherty (a resident of the Clougherty
household) reflected back on the incident as follows:
I was in bed on the third floor of my house when I heard a deep rumble…When I
awoke, it was in several feet of molasses—it didn’t dawn on me immediately that
it was molasses. I thought I was overboard…I looked for my mother…It was as if
my house had been split in two when it hit the elevated structure—me in one side,
others in the other. I looked for an hour and someone told me my mother was
dead. 20
People soon rushed to the scene to assist injured victims and to help clean up the fantastic
mess. Rescue teams including the Boston policemen and firefighters, nurses from the nearby

Haymarket Square Relief Station, and over 100 sailors from Nantucket “worked to save those
trapped in the horrible ooze.” 21 Puleo quotes a Boston Post article that describes the situation:
The sight that greeted the first of the rescuers on the scene is almost indescribable
in words. Molasses, waist deep, covered the street and swirled and bubbled about
the wreckage. Here and there struggled a form—whether it was animal or human
being was impossible to tell. Only an upheaval, a thrashing about in the sticky
mass, showed where any life was. Horses died like so many flies on sticky fly
paper. The more they struggled, the deeper in the mess they were ensnared.
Human beings—men and women—suffered likewise. 22
It was really a very horrific sight to see, and the sheer thought that this common household
product could result in so much destruction under the right (or wrong) circumstances was quite
disturbing in itself. Colonel Hugh Ogden (who would serve as auditor over the civil court case)
succinctly expressed this very idea when he wrote in his final report that “The scene was
unparalleled in the severity of the damage inflicted to person and property from the escape of
liquid from any container in a great city.” 23 The physical toll the disaster took on people was
visible in the form of broken bones, bruising, lacerations, pneumonia, and shock, not to mention
death and permanent injury. 24 At first, cleanup crews attempted to remove the hardening
molasses by means of chisels and saws, but when that didn’t work, they flushed the streets with
briny water. 25 The search for the bodies of missing persons continued until May 12, 1919 when
the 20th victim of the flood was found. 26
As you can see, many of the observations of the event came from newspapers the day
after the failure of the holding tank. A closer look at the papers will show the difference in facts
that they provide. Could the pressure to relay news to the public as quickly as possible have led
these writers to brush over certain details or make assumptions that they might not have been
qualified to make? For instance, some of the papers that I looked at dated January 16, 1919 had

differing death tolls. The Boston Evening Globe counted twelve in their List of Dead at North
Grove Street Morgue and at the scene of the accident, as did the New York Times, but the Boston
Post stated that only eleven were dead. Each of these numbers would prove to be pretty far off
from the total number (twenty-one), which minimally shows the truth that can be lost in any
“news frenzy” that erupts after a disaster. Still, this is not the strongest argument because the
numbers provided were either the same or very close, and we do not expect newspaper reporters
to have full details right after the event.
I think a better argument can be found in the array of reasonings given for the flood,
which demonstrates the general confusion at the time. To illustrate, the Boston Evening Globe
showed two sides of the debate, explaining that the public’s experts concluded that it was not
caused by any explosion, while the ex-building commissioner as well as a chemist employed in
the Building Department decided that the event had to be attributed to an explosion because
molasses (being so slow-moving) could not cause that kind of damage on its own; they also
argued that other molasses tanks had exploded before. 27 On the other hand, the Boston Post
made it quite clear under their front page headline that an internal explosion was the cause;
chemists believed that since the molasses tank was fitted with a heating apparatus that was
connected to a boiler, a mixture of air and gasoline could have generated, which would have
been explosive. 28 Strangely enough, the New York Times failed to give a clear reason at all, only
once using the word “explosion,” but otherwise avoiding definite conclusions altogether. 29 The
communication of either false conclusions or a mixture of possibilities illustrates the great state
of confusion at the time; people genuinely did not know what happened or why. This also
exposes the unreliability of newspapers as credible sources. In an effort to transfer the news to
the people as quickly as possible, assumptions are made and truth can easily be displaced; this is

particularly visible in the Boston Post article that fully attributed the incident to an explosion,
which we would later discover officially after the trial to be utterly false. It is instances like
these in which the public must assess their own ultimate objective; they must decide between
immediacy and truth. Would we rather have a quick story with roughly accurate details
straightaway, or would we be willing to wait for what might be an extended period of time until
all the questions pertaining to the event are answered and a full report can be given?
Unfortunately, we live in a society that wants its news and wants it fast, so I think it is safe to say
that most of us would be willing to sacrifice at least parts of the truth, if not the entire truth, for
merely a sliver of an accurate story.
Additionally, taking a look at another perspective of the “news frenzy,” one can see the
inevitable panic that proceeds from horrific events such as these. For example, in an article of
the Boston Evening Globe following the event, one writer took note of steam that was escaping
from the crevices of where the Bay State freight house stood before the flood, expressing
concern that were molasses to have gotten down into the crevices, it might have drowned out any
fires but it also could very well create more explosions due to its flammability. 30 In an article
printed a few weeks later, it was reported that one North End business man “presented a
resolution regarding the recent molasses tank disaster in the North End.” He proposed that
“members of the Columbus Club dwelling in the North End [should] protest against allowing
great gas tanks to remain in a densely settled district.” 31 With that said, the people of Boston
were put into a state of panic after the failure of the holding tank; and as a result, they anticipated
other potential dangers. One can only imagine the great amount of fear they felt, especially
considering their newly-inspired anxieties about gas holding tanks failing. (Contemporary

sources referred to “gas,” which was most likely natural gas.) After all, if a molasses storage
tank could do that much damage, how much could a tank full of gas potentially do?
As with all considerable mishaps, someone had to take responsibility, and it was a classic
case of the “blame game.” The initial court proceedings proved insufficient to the people, as
Chief Justice of Municipal Court Wilfred Bolster stated that the public was largely to blame for
the incident. Bolster proclaimed, “A public which, with one eye on its tax rate, provides itself
with an administrative equipment 50 percent qualified, has no right to complain that it does not
get a 100 percent product…it must expect breakdowns in its machinery.” 32 He went on to say
that “the only assignable crime involved is manslaughter, through negligence.” 33 Regarding the
criminal lawsuit that was filed, the Suffolk County Grand Jury returned no bill against the United
States Industrial Alcohol Company with no indictments because they were unable to decide who
should be deemed liable. 34
After this unsatisfying court experience, the victims and their families took their 119
separate legal claims against USIA to the Superior Court where they were consolidated into one
legal proceeding. 35 It is important to note that that presiding court official was not a judge but an
auditor; it was the task of Colonel Hugh Ogden to evaluate “arguments, evidence, and testimony
to decide whether the case should proceed to full trial.” 36 The main argument of the defense was
that the failure of the tank was caused by a bomb planted by anarchists while the plaintiffs
sought out retribution for a shoddy, quick construction job. The defense’s main argument
initially appeared to have substance, as there had been countless bombings by anarchist groups in
the area around the time of the flood, but, as Hugh W. Ogden points out in his official report,
No bomb or high explosive and no traces of a bomb or high explosive were
discovered at or near the scene of the accident….No anarchist or other evilly

disposed person was seen at or near the tank upon the day of the accident. No
evidence was offered to connect the statements of fact set out in the offer of
proof…. 37
The most significant evidence used against the defendants was the testimony of their newlyappointed assistant treasurer and vice president, Arthur P. Jell, who testified that he had had no
technical or engineering training whatsoever, that he had neither submitted the plans for the tank
to any architect or engineer nor had he had them examined, that he had not ensured that the
material received was what had been ordered, and that he had not had the tank inspected or
properly tested after its construction because he had considered it an “unnecessary expense.” 38
In the end, Ogden found USIA liable and ordered them to pay an estimated $300,000 in
damages; however, the plaintiffs were still not pleased with the damage awards and insisted on a
jury trial whereupon USIA immediately agreed to a private settlement, paying a total of
approximately $628,000. 39
In the end, justice was served; not only did the victims and their families get the money
they deserved for their pain and suffering, but the rest of society learned a valuable lesson as
well. The event served as a major factor in changing the engineering protocol. As Puleo affirms,
after the ordeal, “the Boston Building Department began requiring that all calculations of
engineers and architects be filed with their plans and that stamped drawings be signed, a practice
that became standard across the country.” 40 This new attention to safety also demanded
extensive testing of apparatuses and a follow-up construction program to ensure that things were
operating smoothly. 41 In the years after the extensive civil lawsuit that followed the disaster, the
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics would reiterate these new expectations in the field of
safety in the following bulletin:

The day is here when the qualifications for an inspector demand not only
intelligent persons, not only those well equipped with industrial training, not only
the specialist in industry, but the men and women, to some extent at least, who
have a high appreciation of the importance of the work they are doing. 42
This description of an ideal inspector is a far cry from Jell, the unqualified (in terms of technical
or engineering training) financial administrator who rushed construction on the Commercial
Street molasses storage tank to save time, money, and face.
In summation, I have done my best to reconstruct the events of the Boston Molasses
Disaster of January 15, 1919. I realize that there are drawbacks to researching a somewhat
obscure topic in such a short period of time, but I believe I used the primary and secondary
sources that I had to the best of my ability, uncovering as much truth as possible. My writing is
flawed in that it is not based on the 25,000 pages of trial transcript, which is key in understanding
this topic, and because I relied a lot on newspapers, which distort truth in themselves.
Nevertheless, my objective was to convey to you as the reader the reasons for the failure of the
molasses storage tank, the effects it had on the people and buildings of the surrounding area upon
failing, and the valuable lessons learned from the mistakes made in the construction of the tank
that were then applied and used to improve future engineering protocol, which I believe I have
done successfully. Referring back to the question I posed at the beginning of the paper, there is
no correct way to reconstruct history; the best we can do is to properly attend to the facts we do
have and to trust ourselves and others to uphold what should be a moral obligation to promote
truth.
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